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INTRODUCTION 
 
The fundamental question in this home-rule proposition is this: Shall we 
continue the American policy from which we have been trying to get 
away, in our academic discussions at least, for the past twenty years, of 
considering that municipalities have only those rights which are, 
specifically expressed in their charters, granted by the legislature; or shall 
we reverse that process and give to cities, by a broad grant of general 
power, applicable alike to cities which frame their own charters and to 
other cities, the right to control their local affairs? 
- D.E. Wilcox, “Home Rule for Cities,” 1915 
 
On Tuesday, November 4, 2008 the positions of nine township assessors in 
Marion County, Indiana were eliminated by a majority vote of county residents. The vote 
was expected. In the year proceeding, news articles, propaganda, and public outcries 
demanding an end to inefficient overspending by local governments were widespread in 
the area. County voters sought to save money by streamlining what they perceived were 
the redundant functions of their county and township assessors’ offices. Nine township 
assessors are now out of work (but still being paid), and the majority of voters in Marion 
County are eagerly awaiting their lighter taxpaying load. As government spending often 
has it, they may be waiting a long time.  
 The elimination of township assessors in Indiana was part of broader streamlining 
recommendations by the Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform, created in 
2007 on a proposal from Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels. After a recent property tax 
crisis brought into question the excessive spending patterns of Indiana’s counties and 
municipalities, Governor Daniels collaborated with former Governor Joseph Kernan, 
Indiana Supreme Court Chief Justice Randall Shepard, and Indiana University’s Center 
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for Urban Policy and the Environment to research ways in which local government 
structures could be made to run more efficiently so that local government expenditures 
could be substantially reduced. In December 2007, the Commission released the Kernan-
Shepard Report, a compilation of twenty-seven recommendations on local government 
reform. Among other proposals, the report suggested that Indiana work to establish a 
single, elected chief executive in each of its counties and that this executive assume the 
responsibility for administrating duties currently carried out by the county assessor, 
treasurer, auditor, recorder, surveyor, sheriff, and coroner (Indiana Commission on Local 
Government Reform, 2007). The report suggested further that the responsibility for 
administrating the duties of township government, including assessment, EMS and fire 
services, and relief for the poor, should also be assumed by the chief, county executive 
(Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform, 2007). The Commission also 
recommended that school districts, libraries, and other special districts be created large 
enough to provide adequate service to Indiana citizens and to uphold fiscal accountability 
(Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform, 2007). Additionally, the State 
would do well, the Commission proposed, to eliminate separate, municipal elections and 
replace them with a unified election cycle—this, too, for cost savings, accountability, and 
efficiency (Indiana Commission on Local Government Reform, 2007). 
 The 2007 Kernan-Shepard report and the 2008 elimination of township assessors 
by the voters of Marion County is a recent illustration of one of the most salient features 
of state/local dynamics. At the outset, the action of the Governor, Commission, and 
voters seems a simple matter of taxpayer savings and common sense reductions in the 
overlapping responsibilities of local governing bodies. Beneath the pragmatism, however, 
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is a very real example of the more complex, incessant struggle between states and their 
localities over who is ultimately responsible for local government: the locality itself or 
the state in which it resides. Across the country, local governments are constantly at odds 
with their states over the degree of local governing discretion afforded them. Though 
subtle, the debate is a fiery one and is daily played out in courtrooms, city council 
meetings, and state legislative sessions from the east coast to the west. 
In the example provided, for instance, one might wonder if the state-sponsored 
commission would have compiled the same report had the commission included within 
its ranks local township officials. And would Marion County voters have turned the same 
outcome were they influenced by recommendations from a commission that included 
township experts? In fact, was the state considering the local effects of its report when, in 
the name of streamlining, it recommended eradicating the positions of township 
assessors? These assessors were familiar faces in their neighborhoods and were entrusted 
with a working knowledge of its businesses, schools, and culture. Was the commission 
considering the local implications of replacing these assessors with one county assessor 
who is then responsible for every township? The much broader responsibilities of this 
one office seems to necessitate a far more removed, limited knowledge of the streets, 
businesses, schools, and culture in each of the townships.   
Or was it simply good government on the part of the state to pursue efficiency and 
savings regardless of local desires, which are often stuck in tradition and stubbornly wary 
of change? Isn’t it judicious expertise that encourages one to broaden his horizons and 
rise above narrow-minded, local nostalgia so that he can finally understand the greater 
financial pay-offs his broad logic will afford him? In the end, the voters of Marion 
4 
County seem to have agreed with the state: efficiency over familiarity. Cost-savings over 
local spending and small government over big. 
 Is this illustration an outlier? Are the voters of Marion County unique to the 
country? One might naturally wonder if state/local contentions over local autonomy are 
really that different from state to state. Voters in any other state and within any other 
county might have voted similarly to those in Marion County. Might they have? Would 
voters in rural counties of North Dakota also have voted to eliminate their township 
assessors, most of whom were personally known to them? Or would states with strongly 
conservative ideologies, such as Alaska, have commissioned a group of experts to study 
the matter in the first place? One could guess that voters in states with rather large cities, 
such as New York, would have likely sided with the voters of Marion County. Why pay 
the county and any of its townships for the exact same work? Would voters in Miami-
Dade County, Florida have thought the same? The point is: the decision probably would 
not be the same in all fifty states. The interesting question is “why”? Because of varying 
characteristics, states are likely to approach local government very differently. Living in a 
country with fifty states and innumerable local governments which provide us an 
excellent means of comparison, we must then ask the question: is there something 
specific to Indiana that led to its 2008 decision to eliminate the township assessors in its 
most populous county? Or is this a universal phenomenon? Broadly speaking, what are 
the specific characteristics that predict that a state will enhance or eliminate local 
autonomy?   
This question and the ongoing struggle for power between state and local 
governments is the focus of this paper. Specifically, the question is posed: what is home 
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rule authority, or local governing discretion, and what makes a state more likely to allow 
its local governments broader home rule policies? Though the term “home rule” has 
fallen out of use since the 1980s and been replaced with phrases such as “local governing 
discretion,” “local autonomy,” or “local self-government,” the term is utilized in this 
paper because it better connotes the history of local self government in this country. Its 
history adds much to its meaning and is necessary for a more thorough understanding of 
its empirical application. This paper will address both history and empiricism. The first 
chapter briefly discusses the debate surrounding broad home rule policies. The second 
chapter explores the historical struggle for home rule authority. The third provides 
additional case studies of state/local struggles over local autonomy and describes the need 
for state-to-state comparative analysis. The fourth chapter adds to the sparse research on 
home rule to create a theoretical framework explaining why home rule policies may be 
different from state to state. The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters are committed to data-
testing, analysis of findings, and the paper’s conclusion.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
CHAPTER ONE: THE HOME RULE DEBATE 
 
 The struggle over home rule began during the mid nineteenth century and 
increased in intensity toward the turn of the century as local governments grew 
substantially in size and number. Governing responsibilities naturally followed suit, 
increasing alongside local populations, wealth, and expansions of infrastructure. It wasn’t 
long before these increasing responsibilities became recurring issues of debate on state 
legislative floors throughout the country. State and local governments were at odds over 
which responsibilities belonged to the state and which to the blooming metropolises. 
State legislatures fought for control over the localities, often to reap the fiscal benefits of 
their growing wealth. At the same time, rural Populist reformers and later the more urban 
Progressives, distrustful and wary of state interference in their towns and cities, fought 
vehemently for more self-government. The reformers were committed to what they 
perceived was the political wholesomeness of their rural and blue-collar lives. Most 
understood the value of a dollar and a day’s hard labor. So grounded, they sought 
freedom from what they felt was the greedy oversight of state political bosses. They 
desired enough autonomy to make decisions that were best for their communities and 
without selfish motives. Theirs, then, was a fight for greater “home rule” (Krane et al., 
2001). Because of their efforts and the widespread distribution of political propaganda, 
the term “home rule” became a common household phrase during that era. In fact, most 
of the local government amendments added to state constitutions during this time period 
are commonly referred to as home rule amendments. 
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Proponents of home rule or local autonomy today still adhere to many of the same 
tenets of their Populist and Progressive predecessors. Their argument is that local 
autonomy is necessary for “promoting responsive and participatory government by 
bringing the government closer to the people, fostering diversity and experimentation by 
increasing the fora for expressing policy choices and creating a competition for a mobile 
citizenry, and providing a check against tyranny by diffusing power that would otherwise 
be concentrated” (Barron, 2001, p.378). Seeking freedom from state interference and 
enough autonomy for local self-determination, they believe that local government is most 
efficient when allowed to creatively address local concerns using means suited to their 
unique circumstances. Local governments that must submit to standardized state 
regulations (many times without necessary funding) have little recourse but to exhaust the 
limited fiscal resources they already have. In fact, many localities today, as proponents 
argue, create special district governments simply to circumvent the fiscal limitations 
imposed by states (McCabe, 1997). Increases in special district governments, of course, 
necessitate increases in local government spending. Home rule advocates assert that this 
waste of resources would be easily avoided if states simply allowed their localities more 
fiscal freedom.  
Opponents of home rule authority are numerous and varied. Some take issue with 
the fiscal argument asserting that degrees of local autonomy have a significant bearing on 
interstate variations in number of special district governments (Carr, 2006). They assert 
that local governments have plenty of tools at their disposal to adequately adapt to fiscal 
limitations imposed on them by state legislatures and that any argument to the contrary is 
neither reliable nor valid (Lewis, 2000).  Others argue against home rule on social 
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grounds asserting that increases in local autonomy merely lead to increases in local 
inequality. Clearly, poorer communities without help from state government are likely to 
collapse under broader home rule policies while wealthier communities are likely to 
thrive (Pagano, 1990). Additional arguments are made that broader home rule policies 
will inevitably lead to isolationist behavior. Suburban areas, for example, may opt to 
incorporate themselves out of paying for schools, welfare programs, and urban renewal 
projects in urban centers (Schaller, 1961). Most suburbs are not interested in financially 
supporting homeless populations, schools, and dilapidated neighborhoods they rarely 
encounter. Home rule, via incorporation, provides them a means of avoiding these fiscal 
obligations.    
This paper does not attempt to prove or disprove arguments in support of or 
against local autonomy. While the author believes there is substance to arguments for 
broader home rule policy and this preference may find itself weaved throughout her 
work, this is not the focus of this research. Instead, the present debate over home rule is 
important to understanding home rule theory and is therefore imperative to addressing the 
paper’s primary question: what variables predict broader home rule freedoms? Whether 
broader freedoms are “good” or “bad” for local government is not the issue here. The 
intent is to discover which states practice home rule broadly, why they do so, and what 
this means for state/local struggles over local autonomy. A brief look at the history of 
home rule in the fifty states sets the background for these questions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF HOME RULE 
 
 The state/local tension over local autonomy is long standing, commencing early in 
the nineteenth century and continuing to present. Judicial involvement in the matter 
began as early as 1819 when, in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the U.S. 
Supreme Court prohibited states from impairing the obligation of corporate contracts 
(Krane et al., 2001). To make its ruling clear, the Court distinguished between private 
corporations and public, asserting that its decision pertained only to the former. Thus, the 
Court left to states the freedom to impair any contract, including municipal charters, 
states might make with public corporations, meaning towns, cities, and other public 
institutions (Krane et al., 2001). At its extreme then, the ruling allowed a state, if it so 
willed, to legislate a municipality out of existence.  
One of the most well-known decisions regarding state/local authority came nearly 
fifty years later. In 1868, to end any confusion over state/local responsibilities in Iowa 
and to set a precedent for state legislatures across the country, Chief Justice of the Iowa 
Supreme Court John F. Dillon, in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and Missouri River 
Railroad Co., called for the plenary sovereignty of state governments over local matters 
and the absolute subordination of local governments to state authority (Krane et al., 
2001). He declared: 
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and 
rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life 
without which they cannot exist. As it creates so it may destroy….Unless 
there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, 
by a single act, if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great 
a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations of the 
state, and the corporations could not prevent it…They are, so to phrase it, 
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the mere tenants at will of the legislature (City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids 
and Missouri River Railroad Co., 1868). 
 
What thereafter became known as “Dillon’s Rule” emboldened state legislatures. 
To most local governments, however, the decision was one that “acknowledge[d], 
support[ed], and legitimize[d] the intellectual construct of a unitary, centralized sovereign 
endowed with the arbitrary and despotic power of Uranus over his children” (Libonati, 
1988, p.112). In nearly every state since, local communities seeking greater autonomy 
have had to contend with legislative applications of the 1868 ruling, being required to 
prove why a state with sovereign authority should imbue local entities with governing 
autonomy or, in some cases, with any powers at all.   
 The 1868 Iowa case and the state-as-sovereign mindset that followed in the years 
after allowed for numerous instances of state interference in local affairs. Special interest 
legislation cropped up in state legislatures across the country. Local wealth and growing 
resources were exploited for the benefit of the state or, in some cases, a single legislator. 
In many states, city councils and local state legislative delegations, instead of working 
together for the benefit of their constituents, were in competition for grants of special 
privilege (Krane et al., 2001). In other states, these groups collaborated underhandedly 
for local privileges and monetary payoffs (Krane et al., 2001). At their most corrupt, state 
legislatures created or destroyed municipal charters as a means to avoid accumulated debt 
and awarded utility franchises to legislators as patronage for public service (Krane et al., 
2001). Moreover, the “ripper laws” of this time period gave state-appointed officials 
control over municipal activities which otherwise would have been administered by local 
officials (Krane et al., 2001). New York, for example, passed a series of ripper laws in 
1857 that transferred several principal parts of the government of New York City to state-
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appointed commissions (Krane et al., 2001). The creation of the Metropolitan Police 
District out of this legislation resulted in several riots and protests among New York City 
residents (Krane et al., 2001).      
In response to abuses by special interest laws, reformers sought to change the way 
the state addressed local affairs. They began encouraging states to enact systems of 
municipal classification. Via these statutes, all laws applying to a city of a certain size 
applied to all cities of that same size. In other words, first-class cities might be all cities 
with over 200,000 residents; second-class, all cities with 50,000-199,999 residents; and 
third class, all towns and villages with under 50,000 residents. Where the state might 
have once provided a tax break for a specific city, it now was required to provide tax 
breaks for all cities of that class size. Special interests were no longer very special and 
underhanded corruption began losing appeal.       
In spite of the new system, however, local privilege legislation continued. In most 
states, the largest few cities were purposely placed in classification brackets of their own. 
Laws applying to all first or second class cities actually applied to only one or two. As an 
example, the 1969 Unigov law in Indiana which merged the city and county governments 
of Indianapolis was written for all first class cities. Under Indiana law, all first-class cities 
are those with over 250,000 residents. In statute the law applies to all such cities; in 
practice it applies to only one, namely Indianapolis. In this way, many legislatures skirted 
the original intent of classification statutes and continued passing special interest laws.    
To counter the actions of states legislatures, reformers began calling for the 
development of home rule charters (Teaford, 1984). The purposes of these charters were 
threefold: “ (1) to prevent [state] legislative interference with local government, (2) to 
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enable cities [and counties] to adopt the kind of government they desire, and (3) to 
provide cities [and counties] with sufficient powers to meet the increasing needs for local 
services” (American Municipal Association, pp.136-137). Though these charters would 
ultimately have to be approved by state legislatures, they were to be drafted by locally 
appointed commissions and then submitted to the municipality’s legislative body for 
approval (Teaford, 1984). Once approved, any amendments to the charter would have to 
be accepted by the eligible electorate (Teaford, 1984). The charters thus necessitated the 
active involvement of local communities in their once state-determined fate. Through this 
process, reformers hoped to win for municipalities the autonomy necessary to act in the 
best interest of their affairs and to end the special interest abuse in state legislatures 
(Teaford, 1984). 
As localities continued to grow, Populist/Progressive influences heightened, and 
home rule charters were popularized, state legislatures could no longer ignore the local 
call for greater autonomy. Slowly, states began drafting and adopting constitutional home 
rule amendments. In 1875, Missouri became the first state to adopt such a provision 
(Teaford, 1984). California, Washington, and Minnesota followed in the late 1800s 
(Teaford, 1984). In 1910, with pressure from Progressives and vigorous voter support, 
Ohio called a constitutional convention to consider several amendments to its 
constitution, home rule among them. Two years later, voters approved the home rule 
amendment, and in September 1912, it was adopted into the state’s constitution. New 
York in 1963 adopted a home rule amendment that included a bill of rights for local 
governments (“Home Rule and the New York Constitution,” 1966). And the First Class 
City Home Rule Act of 1949 in Pennsylvania authorized the framing and adoption of a 
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charter by the city of Philadelphia (H.L., 1957). Today, forty-eight states have one form 
of home rule authority or another, some granted by their constitutions and others by 
general law. Though the majority of these provisions adhere to Dillon’s Rule, ensuring 
that local governments remain subject to state laws and any regulations the state wishes 
to impose, these new amendments provide local governments most of the freedoms 
necessary for self-government, specifically the framing and adopting of their own 
charters (H.L., 1957).  
After the firm establishment of home rule provisions in most of the fifty states, 
home rule authority became a researchable idea. In 1959, understanding that the home 
rule debate had become an indelible part of the state/local dynamic, the United States 
Congress created the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. In 
November 1981, after several years of research, the group released a report detailing its 
work on the measurement of home rule authority or “local discretionary authority” in 
each of the fifty states.  The commission conceptualized the concept as “ the power of 
local government to conduct its own affairs—including specifically the power to 
determine its own organization, the functions it performs, its taxing and borrowing 
authority, and the numbers, types, and employment conditions of its personnel” (ACIR, 
1981). Home rule, according to the commission, was a compilation of the structural (its 
organization), functional (its performed functions), fiscal (its taxing and borrowing 
authority), and administrative (its personnel issues) authority granted localities by their 
respective states.  
This 1981 conceptualization of home rule authority has remained with it to 
present. Most studies researching the issue utilize the ACIR’s four dimensional approach. 
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Though allowing for empirical research, this definition has also added to the subject’s 
complexity. With four distinct dimensions, home rule according to the ACIR can play a 
very different role from one state to the next. To be sure, one state might grant its local 
governments structural home rule but very limited functional home rule. A state with 
very limited fiscal home rule authority (which is currently the case for the majority of 
states) might have broad administrative home rule powers. So defined, home rule is not a 
singular concept with a singular application. It is a multi-dimensional concept with as 
many applications. It is easy to understand, then, why these dimensions of home rule 
authority and their applied variations in localities as different from one another as San 
Diego, California from Hicksville, Ohio make its study difficult. Specific difficulties in 
research will be addressed later in the paper.  
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CHAPTER THREE: PRESENT DAY EXAMPLES OF HOME RULE 
 
 That states today differ in degrees and dimensions of local autonomy and that this 
difference is important to assessing the state/local dynamics of each is easily argued. New 
York is an interesting case study and perhaps one of the most researched. New York 
exercises tight fiscal and personnel limitations on its local governments while granting 
them broad structural autonomy (Zimmerman, 1983). The limited fiscal autonomy 
afforded local governments is due ironically to the state’s outstanding financial 
generosity. New York is one of the country’s most generous states in local financial aid, 
but it is quick to check this generosity by imposing strict fiscal regulations on how local 
governments can spend their monies (Zimmerman, 1983). The fiscal crises of the 1970s 
instigated by the overspending and borrowing of local governments led the state to 
further tighten these reigns over local fiscal autonomy (Zimmerman, 1983).  
In spite of these financial restrictions, the structural autonomy currently granted 
local governments by the state remains rather liberal. New York as the seat of New York 
City, one of the most populous urban centers in the country, is in an unusual situation. To 
address the multiple demands its growth initiates, from infrastructure to sustainability, 
New York City must have a great deal of structural freedoms. It must have the autonomy 
to create government structures where there is need to do so. Aware of the city’s 
influence in the state legislature, legislators are quickly convinced of the importance of 
local structural autonomy.  
A look at a 1990 event in Florida reveals a different approach to local autonomy 
and begs another interesting question. In November 1990, Florida voters approved 
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Proposition Three, a proposition to end unfunded state mandates imposed on local 
governments. While this act seemed to reveal popular support for local governments at 
the time, the vote was apparently less for local autonomy and more against state 
government (MacManus, 1990). Voters disliked what they perceived was the 
irresponsible spending of local governments, but they detested what they perceived was a 
corrupt state legislature and unrealistic fiscal expectations for local governments 
(MacManus, 1990). It appeared that the Florida voters were more likely to side with local 
governments when the issue of unfunded mandates was in question (MacManus, 1990). 
One wonders why this was the case, especially considering that at the time the state 
granted its local governments relatively broad fiscal freedoms (Hill, 1978). Even so, 
Florida, in contrast to New York, is far more restrictive in the structural autonomy it 
affords it local governments. One might wonder if this difference has played a role in 
Florida’s state/local dynamic and why its residents perceive state government so 
negatively.      
 Georgia proves still more interesting in that home rule for its municipalities is 
granted legislatively in the Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965 (Sentell, 1970). Home rule 
for its counties, on the other hand, is granted via a constitutional amendment ratified by 
voters in 1966 (Sentell, 1970). What this means for Georgia’s local governments is that 
counties are faced with far fewer legislative restrictions on their structural and functional 
autonomy than Georgia’s municipalities (Sentell, 1970). The state has thus created a 
situation in which cities and counties, rather than governing cooperatively, are 
consistently at odds with one another and often in competition. Greater uniformity in 
Georgia’s home rule policies might alleviate some of this competition. Still, one is left 
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wondering why Georgia approaches its municipalities in a more restrictive manner than 
New York, though it, too, is home to a municipality of considerable size and influence. 
  A final example from California adds still more complexity to studies of home 
rule. Jeffrey Chapman conducted a study in 2003 to determine if California’s local 
governments, specifically its counties, had enough local autonomy to adequately adapt to 
Proposition 13, a local government tax cut passed somewhat unexpectedly in 1978. The 
measure added a great deal of fiscal stress to California’s local governments, who were 
already financially strapped at the time (Chapman, 2003). What Chapman (2003) found 
was not surprising. Counties were able to maintain relative stability in spite of the tax cut 
because they had enough structural and functional autonomy to implement new, creative 
revenue-generating activities including land development and the use of community 
facilities district debt or COPs (Chapman, 2003). Would the counties have been able to 
adjust so readily to Proposition 13 if their home rule autonomy were less broad? If such a 
measure was passed in Georgia, where counties would have had the autonomy to 
creatively react but municipalities would have been tightly regulated, would the local 
outcome have been different? Would Georgia’s very limited municipal autonomy leave 
its municipalities struggling for income while county budgets remained balanced? What 
would this mean for city/county relationships?   
***** 
Home rule authority, in spite of its recurrent and divisive application in the states, 
is not widely studied. Few scholarly papers exist on the topic today and the term has 
fallen out of use in political and academic circles. The subject often seems like an ancient 
secret far too removed from present realities to confidently debate or discuss. And it may 
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be. Confusion has made it clandestine. The examples provided above reveal the subject’s 
complexity and diversity, both of which make any comparative study on it very 
complicated. As stated, home rule policies and their applications differ from state to state 
because local government structures, functions, finances, and personnel vary so much 
from state to state. And this difference is likely explained not by one, easily-defined 
variable but by several, multifaceted variables. It is easy understand, then, why few 
academicians and even fewer in the general populace know quite what home rule means 
or why it matters. Even those who have a slight understanding of the topic disagree on its 
meaning and often use it to explain very different political phenomena.  
What follows is an attempt at conducting such a comparative analysis. First 
discussed are a few existing theories on local autonomy. However, because comparative 
studies on home rule are very limited, most of the chapter provides an innovative look at 
the impetuses of broad home rule in the fifty states. Again, the purpose is to explain why 
some states are more likely to adopt broad home rule policies. A discussion follows.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORY BUILDING 
 
 While the extant research does not fully explain the variation in state home rule 
provisions it does point to some potentially important variables. Gordon Clark (1984) 
posited a theory identifying two principles of local autonomy: immunity and initiative. 
He suggested that local governments can exercise autonomy insofar as they are 
“immune” or free from state limitations and/or are free to initiate their own decision-
making powers. Isaiah Berlin (1969) proffered as much several years earlier in Two 
Concepts of Liberty, his work on negative and positive liberty. Like Clark (1984), he 
distinguished between two types of freedoms: the freedom from external or internal 
controls, or negative liberty, and the freedom to determine one’s own destiny, or positive 
liberty. Though Berlin’s works did not specifically address the governing relations 
between state and local governments, his ideas can be applied.     
Using the two principles of autonomy, Clark (1984) classified four ideal types of 
local autonomy, suggesting that local governments can be characterized as having:  both 
initiative and immunity, initiative but no immunity, immunity but no initiative, and no 
initiative and no immunity. These could also be typified in terms of negative and positive 
freedoms (i.e. having both negative and positive freedom, negative freedom but not 
positive freedom, etc.). All four types of local autonomy are apparent in what Clark 
referred to as the “two basic classes of home-rule provisions” (p.203). These classes, 
according to Clark (1984), are based either on the imperium in imperio (imperio) model 
or the National League of Cities (NLC) model. The imperio model, the older of the two, 
was initially exemplified in Missouri’s 1875 home rule provision. In this model, local 
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governments are allotted a specific “municipal sphere” in which they can exercise some 
initiative and are provided some immunity (Clark, 1984). The NLC model, on the other 
hand, demands far more initiative for local governments, requesting they be allowed to 
exercise all delegable powers (Clark, 1984). Of course, if there be reason (or even no 
reason), the state has the authority at any time to legislate these powers back (Clark, 
1984).       
Clark’s theory is helpful in clarifying the complexities of home rule authority in 
the fifty states. His local autonomy typology, however, does not help in explaining why 
one state may differ from another in the breadth of its home rule policies. Indianapolis 
might have initiative but no immunity. And New York City might have both initiative 
and immunity. But these classifications, without testable definitions, cannot 
systematically be compared. They are merely groupings. To address the paper’s primary 
question, one must ask: What are the specific variables that lead to broader local 
autonomy in New York (for example) and how do these differ from the same variables in 
Indiana? These questions are now explored.   
The number of people living in a state’s urban centers or metropolitan areas is the 
most obvious characteristic related to a state’s adoption of broad home rule policies. The 
greater the number of people living in metropolitan areas, the greater the need for local 
autonomy, or the freedoms necessary for meeting increasing demands. New York is a 
clear example. The population that New York City supports demands a very adaptable 
government structure. New, executive offices must be created quickly or old ones must 
adjust when inclement weather leaves roads rife with potholes. When the public 
transportation system no longer sustains the given population, the old one must expand or 
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a new one built. Growing concern for environmental health requires extensive, innovative 
programs and the autonomy necessary to implement them. Permits and licensing 
departments must be able to adjust to increases in applications, and fire, police, and EMS 
departments must continually redraw districts or add new personnel to keep old ones 
efficient. State legislators are thus faced with one of two options: to clog their assemblies 
with city-specific legislation addressing these demands (while also grappling with the 
many challenges facing the state as a whole) or to allow New York City enough 
autonomy to adequately respond to its own challenges. New York state lawmakers 
consistently choose the former.    
V.L. Marando and M.M. Reeves (1993) utilized this same variable when 
attempting to explain the impetuses behind county structural reform. They hypothesized 
that population size and population growth were positively related to county structural 
reform, or reform specific to a county’s charter government, elected executives, and 
appointed administrators (Marando & Reeves, 1993). More populous counties, it was 
assumed, are under more pressure than less populous counties to reorganize their 
structures in order to meet increasing constituent demands (Marando & Reeves, 1993). 
What they found was that population growth and size, or “urbanization”, were indeed 
significant factors in explaining county structural reform (Marando & Reeves, 1993). 
Though this study relates to county reform, it can be applied to state-level reform related 
to local autonomy or the adoption of home rule provisions, as the impetuses are similar. 
States with higher numbers of people living in their metropolitan areas are under more 
pressure than states with lower numbers of people living in such areas to allow localities 
more autonomy because of the increasing demands of their urban constituent base.  
22 
Secondly, income is expected to be a factor influencing broad home rule 
provisions. States with high per capita income are predictably more likely to have broad 
home rule statutes than states with low per capita income. Wealthier states evidence 
wealthier local governments, and where there is wealth, or sufficient resources for 
independent local choices, broad home rule authority is expected. Additionally, as M.A. 
Nelson (1990) suggests, wealth generates increases in populace demands, creating a need 
for broader local autonomy so that localities can respond to their citizens. Marando and 
Reeves (1993) in the study previously mentioned also found that a state’s per capita 
income is positively and significantly related to county government reform. Again, 
though their study assesses county rather than state government, the idea is the same. 
Appeals for local autonomy are more likely to be met where fiscal resources are readily 
available.    
Another less obvious factor related to broad home rule provisions in a state is the 
heterogeneity of its residents. Differences in income, education, race, and age are likely 
to necessitate structural changes in local government, the creation of offices, fiscal 
programs, and assistance plans responsible for addressing multiple demands. Local 
structural changes, of course, can only be initiated under some degree of local autonomy. 
Typically, such autonomy is not hard won. While many states provide their localities 
funding for constituent-based programs, very few wish for the responsibility to 
implement these programs. I therefore expect that greater heterogeneity will lead to a 
greater tendency to adopt broad home rule provisions. The following studies proffer 
useful insight into this relationship. Though they do not specifically assess correlations 
between heterogeneity and broad home rule provisions, their studies are helpful in 
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exploring the relationship between heterogeneity and specific dynamics of local 
autonomy. 
J.A. Temple (1996) used heterogeneity as a variable in her study on the 
relationship between community composition and state-imposed local tax limitations.  
She based her argument on past studies suggesting that heterogeneity, specifically age 
and income variation, creates dissatisfaction among voters when collective decisions are 
made on how and what local government spends its money (Temple, 1996). Such 
dissatisfaction, according to Temple (1996), is apt to increase the likelihood that residents 
will vote for tax limitations. In other words, a 30-year-old resident making $40,000 
annually expects to pay a certain amount of taxes for local services designed to meet her 
younger, middle-class needs. If she is aware that she is not likely to receive these public 
services because her voting-eligible neighbors are much older or have lesser income, she 
becomes a dissatisfied voter. So when state-imposed local tax limitations are up for a 
vote, she is likely to vote in favor of them. To assess this relationship, Temple (1996) 
defined heterogeneity in terms of within-community variation in income and age. What 
she found was that both income and age variations are positively related to state-imposed 
tax limitations, with age being significantly so.  
M.A. Nelson (1990) also utilized heterogeneity as an explanatory variable in his 
study assessing the determinants of local government structure, specifically number of 
local government units in U.S. metropolitan areas. Like Temple, he conceptualized 
heterogeneity as variations in income and age (Nelson, 1990). In addition, he added a 
racial dimension, suggesting that variations in race may also lead to the demand for 
different and more numerous local government services (Nelson, 1990). All three 
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variations, he argued, increase the need for changes in local government structure 
(Nelson, 1990). Heterogeneity, then, was expected to be positively related to the number 
of local government units in U.S. metropolitan areas. Nelson’s initial findings, contrary to 
expectations, suggested that racial heterogeneity is negatively and significantly related to 
number of local general-purpose and special district governments and that age and 
income variations are positively but only slightly related to number of such governments. 
Excluding the racial component, Nelson’s (1990) expectations were met. He found that 
age and income variation is positively and significantly related to the number of local 
governments with taxing authority, including general-purpose and special district 
governments, though age variation has a less significant positive relationship with 
number of general-purpose governments. 
A fourth variable expected to be linked to broad home rule provisions is a state’s 
socio-political culture. Arguably the most well-known researcher to write on political 
culture was D.J. Elazar. In 1966 in his work American Federalism: A View From the 
States, Elazar posited a typology of political subcultures in the United States, proposing 
that states were descriptively bound by one of three cultures: individualistic, moralistic, 
or traditionalistic. To Elazar (1966/1984), states characterized by an individualistic 
culture (i.e. Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania) viewed government primarily as a 
marketplace, were ambivalent towards increases in bureaucracy, accepted a certain 
amount of political corruption, believed that government was best run by professionals, 
and felt that competition should be driven by parties not issues. States such as Minnesota, 
North Dakota, and Wisconsin characterized by a moralistic political subculture, on the 
other hand, perceived government as a commonwealth, viewed bureaucracy positively, 
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saw politics as healthy, believed that government was best when everyone participated, 
and felt that competition over issues was ideal (Elazar, 1966/1984). Finally, the 
traditionalistic subculture, existing in deep south states such as Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, viewed government as a “means of maintaining the existing order,” 
perceived bureaucracy negatively, saw politics as a privilege, believed that only the 
designated elite should govern, and felt that competition should be limited to elite-
dominated factions within dominant parties (Elazar, 1966/1984, pp.120-121). 
Using Elazar’s work, one expects to find that states with broad home rule 
provisions are also characterized by a moralistic subculture. The tendency to view 
political participation as necessary and healthy and to see increases in number of 
government structures as means to fair and neutral governance is likely to beget state 
policies that bring governing responsibilities closer to the people. Contrarily, one expects 
to find that traditionalistic subcultures are least likely to be linked with states 
characterized by broad home rule authority. With their elitist approach to governance, 
traditionalistic cultures perceive authority as a privilege rarely granted. States with such 
an exclusive frame of reference are likely to adhere very strictly to Dillon’s Rule 
principles, providing their local governments exceptionally little structural, functional, or 
fiscal autonomy. 
 Region of the country is a fifth possible explanation for broader home rule 
policies. The North and the South often differ in their approaches to local government, 
the North influenced by its more industrial, liberal history and the South by its agrarian, 
conservative beginnings. Likewise, the East and the West sometimes differ in state/local 
dynamics, as the latter is a much younger region and the former a collection of state/local 
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relationships much longer established. One expects that because of its traditionalistic 
tendencies and the vehemence with which it fought for states rights during the Civil War, 
the South is far less likely than the North to have broad home rule policies (Scruggs, 
2007). Elitist southern states are highly cautious of devolving their powers. 
Comparatively, Northern states are much less threatened by local autonomy, sometimes 
perceiving it as a necessary step toward economic growth and firm standing in the 
competitive market. To clarify, the North’s early advances toward industrialization, 
cross-country transportation, and development of urban infrastructure, created a fertile 
environment for a highly competitive marketplace. City-to-city competition led naturally 
to thriving metropolises, each with greater representation and a louder voice in state 
legislatures than the next. Steps toward broader local freedoms in this region were 
common during the Industrial Era and remain common to date. It is expected, then, that 
Northern states are more inclined than Southern to grant broad home rule authority. 
 The Eastern half of the United States, being older and more developed than the 
Western, encountered state/local tensions over local autonomy much earlier. During the 
late 1800s, while Western territories were slowly adjusting to their promotion into 
statehood, the Eastern states, among a slew of other issues, were enduring debates over 
local autonomy and trying to resolve these differences via constitutional or legislative 
grants of home rule. The East is simply more experienced than the West in issues of state 
sovereignty and local autonomy. Being so experienced, it has worked through these 
issues before the West has even perceived them as problems. It is expected, then, that a 
state’s situation in the Eastern region of the country increases the likelihood of its 
granting broad home rule authority to its local governments.  
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The East/West argument follows from a sixth explanation for broad home rule 
authority. The age of a state is expected to be positively linked to broader home rule 
policies. Again, the older the state, the greater the number of available years for 
amending a constitution or enacting statutes in favor of home rule. The push toward 
greater home rule occurred in the mid 1800s and in the few decades after. At this time in 
history, many Western territories had just entered statehood. Others would not become 
states until many years later. By the time these states were old enough to encounter issues 
of local autonomy, the forces impelling the home rule movement forward in the East, 
including the fight to end special-interest legislation, were dwindling or had already died. 
The age of a state and the six factors discussed above are conceptualized and 
operationalized in the succeeding chapter.       
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA TESTING 
 
 Home rule authority is conceptualized in this study using two elements of the 
1981 ACIR definition. I have chosen to isolate the current analysis to structural and 
functional dimensions of home rule only. While state/local struggles over local fiscal 
autonomy are often intense, they are sporadic and often short lived. Arguments over 
structural and functional home rule authority can be as intense, but where they are not, 
they are almost always more enduring. Structural and functional changes in local 
government involve the transformation of institutions long established. They apply to a 
locality’s form of government, its consolidation regulations, its classification status, its 
annexation and election policies, etc. Necessarily, laws regarding such autonomy cannot 
be as fluid as laws regarding fiscal or administrative autonomy. While frustrating to 
politicians, this lack of fluidity gives to structural and functional home rule a depth and 
solidarity that the other elements of home rule do not possess.   
 In 1978, M.B. Hill published a very thorough comparative assessment describing 
state laws governing local government structure and administration. His is one of the few 
such assessments existing today. In each of the fifty states, he coded state laws affecting 
local form of government, annexation and consolidation, local elections, administrative 
operations and procedures, financial management, and personnel management (Hill, 
1978). Among laws influencing local form of government, he included home rule 
authority, classifying each state according to its grant of structural home rule, broad 
functional home rule, or limited functional home rule (Hill, 1978). According to his 
findings, several states grant their local governments some degree of structural autonomy 
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and limited functional home rule (Hill, 1978). Far fewer grant structural autonomy and 
broad functional home rule (Hill, 1978). This study intends to shine light on the 
characteristics of the latter states, those granting both structural and broad functional 
home rule.  
I assess home rule using two measures taken from M.B. Hill’s 1978 findings. The 
two dependent variables utilized in this study are binary, dummy variables called 
HRULEFUN and HRULESTR (see Appendix A). M.A. Nelson (1990) used a variation 
of these same variables: 
1. HRULEFUN is coded 1 if a state grants broad functional freedoms to local 
government units (cities and counties); 0 if otherwise. 
2. HRULESTR is coded 1 if a state grants structural autonomy to local 
government units (cities and counties); 0 if otherwise.  
The independent or explanatory variables used for this study are based on data 
from the 1970 U.S. Census. This Census is utilized in the study because it provides 
information that coincides with Hill’s home rule data. The nine independent variables 
are: 
1. HURBAN, a dummy variable for urbanness. HURBAN is coded 1 if the 
percentage of a state’s population living in metropolitan areas is greater than 
75; 0 if otherwise. 
2. RACE, a dummy variable for racial heterogeneity. RACE is coded 1 if the 
percentage of a state’s nonwhite residents is 15 or higher; 0 if otherwise. 
30 
3. UNDER15, a dummy variable for percentage of young residents in a state. 
UNDER15 is coded 1 if the percentage of a state’s residents under the age of 
15 is 30 or higher; 0 if otherwise. 
4. OVER65, a dummy variable for percentage of older residents in a state. 
OVER65 is coded 1 if the percentage of a state’s residents over the age of 65 
is 11% or higher; 0 if otherwise. 
5. HINCOME, a dummy variable for high per capita income. HINCOME is 
coded 1 if a state’s average per capita income is greater than $3000; 0 if 
otherwise. 
6. POLCUL, a dummy variable for a state’s socio-political subculture. POLCUL 
is coded 1 for moralistic states; 0 for all others. 
7. EREGION, a dummy variable for a state’s situation in the Eastern part of the 
country. EREGION is coded 1 if a state is east of the 92nd parallel (east of the 
Mississippi River); 0 if otherwise. 
8. NREGION, a dummy variable for a state’s situation in the Northern part of 
the country. NREGION is coded 1 if a state is north of the 40th parallel; 0 if 
otherwise. 
9. YRSTAT, a dummy variable for older states. YRSTAT is coded 1 if a state 
entered statehood prior to 1800; 0 if otherwise. 
Binary logistic regression is utilized to determine the logged odds of both broad 
functional home rule authority and structural home rule authority given variations in the 
independent variables. The nine hypotheses explored in the previous chapter are 
operationalized as follows:  
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1. States with a high percentage of their population living in metropolitan 
areas are likely to have broad home rule statutes. The logged odds of 
HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are expected to increase as HURBAN 
increases. 
2. Racially heterogeneous states are likely to have broad home rule statutes. 
The logged odds of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are expected to 
increase as RACE increases. 
3. States with higher percentages of young people are likely to have broad 
home rule statutes. The logged odds of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are 
expected to increase as UNDER15 increases. 
4. States with higher percentages of older people are likely to have broad 
home rule statutes. The logged odds of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are 
expected to increase as OVER65 increases. 
5. States with relatively high per capita income are likely to have broad home 
rule statutes. The logged odds of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are 
expected to increase as HINCOME increases. 
6. States with moralistic political subcultures are likely to have broad home 
rule statutes. The logged odds of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are 
expected to increase as POLCUL increases.   
7. Eastern states are likely to have broad home rule statutes. The logged odds 
of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are expected to increase as EREGION 
increases. 
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8. Northern states are likely to have broad home rule statutes. The logged 
odds of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are expected to increase as 
NREGION increases.   
9. Older states are likely to have broad home rule statutes. The logged odds 
of HRULESTR and HRULEFUN are expected to increase as YRSTAT 
increases. 
The table below shows the nine independent variables and their expected relationship to 
the binary dependent variables.  
Table 1. Proposed hypotheses 
 
Employing these hypotheses, the binary, logistic regression formulas are:  
• Logged odds (HRULFUN) = b0 + b1(HURBAN) + b2(RACE) + b3(UNDER15) + 
b4(OVER65) + b5(HINCOME) + b6(POLCUL) + b7(EREGION) + b8(NREGION) + 
b9(YRSTAT) 
• Logged odds (HRULSTR) = b0 + b1(HURBAN) + b2(RACE) + b3(UNDER15)  + 
b4(OVER65) + b5(HINCOME) + b6(POLCUL) + b7(EREGION) + b8(NREGION) + 
b9(YRSTAT) 
Odds ratios obtained from these equations reveal the extent to which the odds of strong 
functional and structural home rule authority change for each unit change in each of the 
 
HURBAN RACE UNDER15 OVER65 INCOME POLCUL EREGION NREGION YRSTAT 
          
HRULESTR 
-Structural 
home rule 
authority? 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
 
         
HRULEFUN 
– Broad 
functional 
home rule 
authority? 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
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independent variables. The hope is to find that given increases in percentages of 
metropolitan residents, races other than White, residents younger than 15 and older than 
65, per capita income, moralistic subculture, Northern and Eastern situation, and year of 
statehood, the likelihood of a state’s having broad functional or structural home rule 
authority increases with each, and significantly so.  
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS 
 
 While some of the results were in the directions expected, unfortunately none 
showed significant effects. As expected, high percentages of people living in 
metropolitan areas was positively related to both the likelihood of a state’s granting 
structural home rule and to the likelihood of a state’s granting broad functional home 
rule. Though the relationship was strong for both dependent variables, it was not 
significant.  
Racial heterogeneity was also positively related to the logged odds of both 
structural home rule and functional home rule. The relationship to the logged odds of 
structural home rule was very weak. The relationship to the logged odds of functional 
home rule showed more strength but was not significant. These results seem to support 
Nelson’s (1990) study. Racial heterogeneity appears to be an insignificant factor in 
matters of local autonomy.  
  The relationship between UNDER15 and the logged odds of broad functional 
home rule was in the direction expected. The relationship was stronger for broad 
functional autonomy, much weaker for structural autonomy. Neither relationship was 
significant. As expected, OVER65 was positively related to the likelihood of broad 
functional home rule. Contrary to expectations, the variable was negatively related to the 
likelihood of structural autonomy. The inconsistency of these findings suggests that age 
has no significant bearing on the likelihood of structural home rule in a state. Though it 
shows promise for relationship with broad functional home rule, it is not a significant 
predictor here. 
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HINCOME was also an inconsistent variable. While it was positively related to 
the logged odds of structural home rule, it was negatively related to the logged odds of 
functional home rule. These findings suggest that a state’s average per capita income also 
has no significant bearing on a state’s likelihood of adopting broad functional or 
structural home rule provisions.  
  Moralistic political subculture was positively and strongly, though not 
significantly, related to structural home rule authority. Contrary to expectations, it was 
negatively related to broad functional home rule authority. The variable appears strong 
enough in its relationship with structural home rule to warrant further study. A slight 
redefinition or re-conceptualization in future studies may lead to statistical significance. 
While the variable’s negative relationship to the logged odds of functional home rule was 
contrary to predictions, this finding may be supported by D.Y. Miller’s 1991 study on 
political culture and patterns of state and local expenditures. Miller (1991) found that 
expenditures for both state and local government were lower in traditionalistic states than 
in moralistic and individualistic states. In individualistic states, expenditures were higher 
for local governments and lower for state governments (Miller, 1991). And in moralistic 
states, expenditures were higher for state governments and lower for local governments 
(Miller, 1991). If lower local government expenditures imply less functional autonomy, 
the findings support Miller’s study. 
 Contrary to expectation, EREGION, NREGION, and YRSTAT were negatively 
related to structural home rule authority. EREGION and NREGION were also negatively 
related to broad functional authority, though YRSTAT, as predicted, was positively 
related to this dependent variable. The findings suggest that a state’s age is unrelated to 
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its likelihood of adopting broad home rule provisions. Interestingly, while EREGION and 
NREGION are invalid variables, they appear to be reliable. There may be some 
association between a state’s region and its likelihood of granting structural and broad 
functional home rule authority, though this association would be in the opposite 
directions discussed in this paper. Eastern states and northern states seem to be less 
inclined to grant their cities and counties local autonomy. This paper hypothesizes that 
the older, more established states found in these sections of the country are more likely to 
have amended their constitutions or passed statutes in favor of home rule during the home 
rule movement in the mid 1800s. However, it may be that many of these states are still 
unwilling to relinquish the sovereignty granted them in the early years of the country. 
Because of their inconsistencies, race, age, income, and age of state were removed 
from the final variable equation for the logged odds of structural home rule. Table 3 in 
Appendix B shows the relationship between structural home rule and all remaining 
variables. The strength of the relationships strongly improve, though none are significant. 
As predicted, a state’s urbanness and moralistic subculture are positively related to its 
likelihood of granting structural home rule. Though a state’s situation in the North and its 
situation in the East are again negatively related to logged odds of structural home rule, 
the reliability of these variables suggest a possible relationship with the dependent 
variable in the opposite direction predicted. 
 Political culture, income, and year of statehood were removed from the final 
equation for logged odds of broad functional home rule. The variables were considered 
unreliable. Because preliminary findings showed that race and age were strongly, though 
not significantly, linked to broad functional home rule, they were left in the equation. 
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Table 5 in Appendix B shows the relationship between variables. As expected, urbanness, 
race, and age are all positively related to home rule authority. Contrary to predictions, a 
state’s situation in the East and a state’s situation in the North are negatively related to 
broad functional home rule. However, these two variables again prove reliable.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
 
 Further analysis is necessary for a thorough look at state-to-state variations in 
home rule statutes. Contrary to what was posited here, the addition of administrative and 
fiscal home rule as dependent variables may be necessary to properly assess the influence 
of the proposed variables on state grants of local powers. Fiscal home rule especially 
might be more influential than the two dimensions of home rule assessed here. 
Additionally, it may be necessary to assess functional and structural home rule separately. 
Factors affecting a state’s decision to grant cities and counties structural autonomy are 
often far different than those affecting a state’s decision to grant cities and counties 
functional freedoms. A state’s grant of structural autonomy, for instance, may be 
influenced most by its history and culture, while its grant of functional autonomy may be 
influenced most by its minority populations, geography, or wealth.  These differences 
were not apparent in this paper and may have significantly added to its results.    
Lastly, it was assumed before research began that broad local autonomy is natural 
progression for local governments, especially as they continue growing in size, numbers, 
and influence. It was also assumed that state governments are hindrances to local 
satisfaction. If state governments simply relinquished their control over local cities and 
counties, these latter units could finally find the autonomy they’ve been seeking for the 
past few centuries. What became evident at this paper’s end is that local governments 
might not be wishing for increases in governing discretion. Contrary to all assumptions 
made, local governments may be wishing for as little autonomy as possible. Most local 
governments may be pleased to submit to state authority, so long as they are assured of 
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adequate funding or some form of bailout should they encounter financial trouble. 
Autonomy, after all, begets responsibility. It seems to be so much easier to blame a 
higher power when local spending goes awry than to be accountable for changing it. But 
if this accountability is written into code, it is not inconspicuously passed on to a higher 
power. Unfortunately, all variables presented here operate under the opposite assumption: 
local autonomy is desired, forward movement. Alexis de Tocqueville during his visit to 
America in the 1830s had this to say about municipal government: “Municipal 
independence in the United States is therefore a natural consequence of this very 
principle of the sovereignty of the people” (p.67). Perhaps de Tocqueville was mistaken. 
Perhaps our people simply do not wish to be sovereign. The November 2008 elections in 
Marion County, Indiana may be evidence enough.       
In sum, the following point should be made: studies of home rule authority are 
essential for an adequate understanding of state-local relationships. Degrees of local 
autonomy have implications for a broad and complex range of state-local issues, from 
campaign finance reform (Briffault, 1989) to urban sprawl (Barron, 2003) and property 
taxes (Sokolow, 1998). The battle between state and local governments for more self-
determination or less will likely always exist and it will be up to citizens to decide which 
side to be on. Future studies will perhaps make such a decision easier; and if not easier, at 
least as always, more educated.  
“To sum up, the point I have been trying to make is this: that given a far-
reaching provision in the new constitution providing for municipal home 
rule, we must have an intelligent, well-directed home rule spirit awake in 
the state to make it effective. There does exist a real demand for home rule. 
We have come about to the end of the preaching stage…There is a fertile 
field to work in” (Wilcox et al., 1915, p. 79).  
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APPENDIX A 
 
As noted, M.B Hill (1978) gathered data on legislation regarding six primary areas of 
local government structure and administration: form of government, annexation and 
consolidation, local elections, administrative operations and procedures, financial 
management, and personnel management. Under “form of government,” he labeled states 
according to six more specific types of legislation. Two pertained to home rule authority: 
whether cities were granted home rule and whether counties were granted home rule. For 
each category, Hill (1978) examined how home rule was granted (via state constitution or 
general law) and what types were granted (structural, broad functional, or limited 
functional).  His findings are as follows. 
Table 2. Taken from State Laws Governing Local Government and Structure (Hill, 1978) 
  
Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
        
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
  x x  x x x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
  x x   x  
b. Granted by 
    general law  
   x  x  x 
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
   x  x x x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
   x  x x  
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e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
x x 
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
  x x  x x  
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
  x x   x  
b. Granted by 
    general law  
   x  x x  
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
   x  x x  
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
   x  x   
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x    x  
 
 
  
Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
        
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
 x x x x  x  
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
   x x  x  
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x x x     
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c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
x x x x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
 x    x   
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x x x  x  
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
  x x x  x  
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
   x x  x  
b. Granted by 
    general law  
  x      
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
  x  x  x  
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
        
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x x x  x  
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Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
        
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
 x x  x x x x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
  x  x x x x 
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x     x  
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
 x x  x  x  
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
 x   x  x  
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x   x  x 
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
  x  x  x  
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
    x  x  
b. Granted by 
    general law  
  x    x  
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
  x  x  x  
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
    x  x  
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e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
x 
 
 
  
Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
        
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
 x x  x x x x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
 x x  x x   
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x x     x 
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
 x x  x x  x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
  x  x    
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
 x       
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
 x   x x  x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
 x   x x   
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x      x 
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c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
x x x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
    x x   
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
 x      x 
 
 
  
New 
Hampshire 
New 
Jersey 
New 
Mexico 
New 
York 
North 
Carolina 
North 
Dakota 
Ohio 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
        
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
 x x x x  x x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
   x x  x x 
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x x  x   x 
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
  x x x  x x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
  x  x  x x 
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
 x  x     
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Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
   x x   x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
   x x   x 
b. Granted by 
    general law  
    x   x 
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
   x x   x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
    x    
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
       x 
 
 
  
Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode 
Island 
South 
Carolina 
South 
Dakota 
Tennessee 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
        
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
 x x x x x x x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
 x x x x  x x 
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x x   x   
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
 x x x x x x x 
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d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
x x x x 
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x x x    
         
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
  x x  x x x 
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
  x x   x x 
b. Granted by 
    general law  
  x   x   
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
  x x  x x x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
  x   x x x 
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
   x     
 
 
  
Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West 
Virginia 
Wisconsin Wyoming 
FORM OF 
GOVERNMENT 
         
          
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to cities 
 x x   x x x x 
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a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
  x   x x x x 
b. Granted by 
    general law  
 x x   x x   
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is   
    granted 
 x x   x x x x 
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
 x     x   
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x   x  x x 
          
Home rule 
authority is 
granted to 
counties 
 x x   x  x  
a. Granted by 
    state 
    constitution 
 x x   x    
b. Granted by 
    general law  
  x     x  
c. Structural 
    home rule 
    authority is 
    granted 
 x x   x  x  
d. Broad 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted 
 x        
e. Limited 
    functional 
    home rule 
    authority 
    is granted  
  x     x  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table 3.  Logged odds of structural home rule authority 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
HURBAN 1.662 .918 3.278 1 .070 5.271 
POLCUL 2.509 1.435 3.059 1 .080 12.293 
EREGION -.666 .765 .759 1 .384 .514 
NREGION -2.365 1.310 3.259 1 .071 .094 
Step 1 
Constant .046 .683 .005 1 .946 1.047 
 
Table 4. Logged odds of structural home rule authority, all variables 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
HURBAN 1.465 1.206 1.474 1 .225 4.327 
RACE .390 1.050 .138 1 .710 1.476 
UNDER15 .071 .828 .007 1 .932 1.073 
OVER65 -.247 .867 .081 1 .776 .781 
HINCOME .609 .878 .480 1 .488 1.838 
POLCUL 2.080 1.484 1.967 1 .161 8.008 
EREGION -.618 .966 .409 1 .522 .539 
NREGION -1.921 1.409 1.861 1 .173 .146 
YRSTAT -.761 1.007 .571 1 .450 .467 
Step 1 
Constant -.007 1.012 .000 1 .994 .993 
 
 
 
 
 
